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ABSTRACT

Sixteen questions dealing with racial equality, abortion, and civil liberties were extracted from the National Opinion Research Center's General Social Surveys of 1972 (N=986) and 1980 (N=1,128) to seek a possible cultural component of rurality and note any changing contours to such a phenomenon over time and across social strata. Rural sociology's ongoing search for a nominal and operational definition has generally accepted three broad components of "rural": ecological, occupational, and cultural, with "rural culture" perceived as being relatively reluctant to shed established mores. Sixteen questions clearly could not cover what might be considered the domain of "rural culture," but did focus on social issues representative of a turbulent historical period of change. Findings suggested that attitude structures changed little over the decade, while levels of conservatism showed a statistically significant increase. The overall explanatory structure (both slopes and intercepts) changed although levels of education and levels of church attendance had consistent (but inverse) impacts on degree of conservatism. Size of place of current residence was conspicuously absent as an important predictor. Since size of place is the most often used proxy for rural versus urban milieu, caution was urged in interpreting much of the literature on rural-urban differences. (BRR)

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The Cultural Component of Rurality: Determinants and Structural Stability Over Time

Abstract

The decade of the 70's is generally regarded as one of increasing conservatism in attitudes and lifestyle. Using general social survey data from the period 1972 to 1980 the paper describes and explains some of the fundamental shifts in socially conservative attitudes (i.e. attitudes concerning civil liberty, abortion, racial segregation) which occured during the 1970's. Findings suggest the following: (1) attitude structures changed little over time, (2) levels of conservatism showed a statistically significant increase over the decade, (3) the overall explanatory structure (both slopes and intercepts) changed over the time period investigated. However, levels of education and levels of church attendance had consistent (but inverse) impacts on degree of conservatism. (4) Size of place of current residence was conspicuously absent as an important predictor. Since this is the most often used proxy for rural vs. urban melieu, we encourage caution in interpreting much of the literature on rural urban differences.

The Cultural Component of Rurality: Determinants and Structural Stability Over Time

A.E. Luloff, Michael K. Miller and Lionel J. Beaulieu[1]

The Meaning of Rural: A Research Problem

One of the more continuous issues in rural sociology has been asearch for a definition, both nominal and operational, of "rural." Despite the discipline's failure to achieve a consensus on definition, there is a general agreement that the major concept, with its considerable vagaries, is sufficiently well routinized on bounds to allow its meaningful use in empirical analysis. This paper both accepts and challenges - in conclusion - this presumption.

Generally, rurality is construed to have three broad components: Ecological, occupational, and cultural (Beaier et al., 1965). More specifically, "rural" designates lots of space, few people, small towns, and reduced social differentiation; work forces slanted towards agriculture or other occupations putting workers in direct contact with the physical environment; and, the less changeful, more conservative modes of thinking and acting of people. Regarding the last, a recent summary review (Willits et al., 1982:72) avered, "rural dwellers (in the U.S.A.), in comparison with urban people, generally tend to be more traditional in their moral orientation, less accepting of minority rights." That review, however, went on to note, "the existing evidence (for such differences) is fragmentary" and also called for the need to get an understanding of why cultural patternings

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of the rural construct are as they are (Willits et al., 1982:73). This paper attempts to address both these deficiencies.

The purpose of the current analysis is to determine the prevalence of a cultural component of rurality (cf. Miller and Luloff, 1981) identify the possible determinants of such an element, and examine the degree of their structural stability/change during the 1970-1980 decade. We focus on that time span because it was a period of major social turmoil and presumed changes in lifestyles, values, attitudes, and politics for the American nation.

Turmoil in American Society

The postwar baby boom progeny approached maturity during the 1960's raised in and looking forward to a continued era of prosperity. American factories and mills were producing at record levels, the construction and housing businesses were booming, the programs of the New Frontier and the Great Society were pouring millions of dollars into impoverished areas and creating numerous jobs in the public sector (cf. Bluestone and Harrison, 1982).

Important legislation in the mid 1960's, following upon the heels of the Brown vs. Board of Education (1954) decision against school desegregation, focused attention on the smoldering race problems of America. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were efforts on the part of Congress to end discriminatory practices in the election process. The former act prohibited registrars from applying different standards to white and Black voting applicants and from disqualifying minority members because of inconsequential errors on their forms; the latter legislation took special steps to provide for the enforcement of the 1964 provisions.

Despite numerous obstacles used primarily to circumvent the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the number of registered Black voters in the South increased dramatically. By 1970, almost two-thirds of all eligible Black voters in 11 southern states were registered to vote (Simpson and Yinger, 1972). With this gain came some heightened political responsibility and positions, but clearly not all was well in the racial area.

Soon after the legislative victories of 1964 and 1965, the Los Angeles ghetto of Watts erupted, triggering the long, socially hot summers of the late 1960's. The freedom marches, the sit-ins, and passive resistance characteristic of the Civil Rights Movement in the early 1960's gave way to the rage of racial violence. Actions were sought not legislative words, and new demands were made by Black Americans for Black Americans. In April of 1969, at the National Black Economic Development Conference, the notion of reparation - recompense for all the years of slavery, exploitation, and humiliation - was coined. And closely paralleling this phenomenon was the increasing visibility given to those among the Black community who called for a physical and cultural separation among the races. Both of these demands were fueled by white reluctance to accept or endorse the logic of the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights Acts and white fear of "guerrilla warfare" in what they took to be "their" cities (Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968).

At the same time that the country was wrestling with its historical problems of racism, a deepening crisis in the nation's largest cities was surfacing. The commercial, industrial, and financial dominance of the large urban center had continued unabated following World War II. By 1970, almost two of every three Americans were residentially part of a metropolitan area. And, the growth in the metropolitan population was generally supplemented by

growth in the boundaries of the central city. The latter characteristic reflected the growth of "suburban" satellite communities inextricably linked to the core city via transportation and communication networks, and the interdependence of them in terms of labor force and consumer demand (Long, 1981; Sternlieb, Hughes, and Hughes, 1982). In short, there was a marked tendency for metropolitan agglomeration of people, with the now familiar accompanying social problems. The two were not unrelated. Decay of the core city was highlighted by periods of urban unrest. Significant minority protests in Detroit, Cleveland, Newark, and Plainfield all exploded during the summer of 1967 and each acted to underscore some of the more bitter and deep-rooted dissension in the nation's cities. While racial unrest was part of the problem, other divisive issues such as environmental degradation and destruction impacted life in the U.S.A. as well (cf. Carson, 1962; Hardin, 1968).

America in the 1970's was a nation under internal assault. In the beginning of the decade the country was recoiling from a steady stream of attacks on the so-called "establishment." An undeclared, and for many citizens, an unwanted and unpopular war raged in Vietnam. Annual marches on Washington, D.C. - in protest of the war, in concern for unrealized civil rights, and in anguish for destruction of the environment - marked this period. America's youth increasingly shouted rejection of status quo answers to these and other pressing social problems. To them, and especially those youth in the urban ghettos, where resistance and rebellion had reached a peak of intensity, change needed to occur. Satisfactory change was construed as not coming about simply by extending the technological and intellectual resources of established American institutions. Indeed, these very things were the ones being challenged, the points at issue.

The issues of racial and civil liberties shared headlines with debate over abortion legalization. An increased concern over the rights of the indigent, coupled with a rapidly accelerating rate of women entering the labor force and demanding equal opportunity and pay,[2] focused attention on issues associated with women's rights. Of these, perhaps no other controversy so stirred public emotions as access to legalized abortions (Granberg and Granberg, 1981; Granberg, 1978; Clayton and Tolone, 1973).

As with racism, a Supreme Court ruling provided the impetus for the debate. In 1973 the Supreme Court handed down decisions on two, now famous cases - Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton (cf. Palley, 1978). In the first, concerning a challenge to an 1857 Texas statute sanctioning abortion only for the purpose of saving the mother's life, the Court's ruling - on the basis of privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment - affirmed a woman's right to make a decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. Certain qualifications on that right of the individual were introduced as well, particularly the guideline of trimester divisions, but essentially the Court declared that the state had no compelling reasons to intervene in abortion decisions during the first trimester. An abortion decision was the woman's right, made in consultation with her attending physician.

In Doe v. Bolton, involving a 1968 Georgia statute which specified four issues of state prerogatives in pregnancy termination, the Court was provided with additional opportunity to elaborate its position on access of women to legalized abortion. The Georgia statute limited willful termination to cases in which the health of a pregnant woman was endangered, the fetus

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[2]The trend for increasing numbers of women, married and single, in the labor force, coupled with the decision to delay or postpone marriage and childbirth for career-related reasons focused the attention of working women on the access to abortion issue. Family planning (which achieved a phoenix-like rise in popularity during this decade) after all, did allow for mistakes.

was likely to have a serious defect upon birth, or the pregnancy was the result of rape. In addition, this statute required accreditation of the hospital performing the abortion, state residency of the woman seeking the abortion in Georgia, the concurrence of two additional physicians (besides the attending doctor), approval by a three-member "abortion committee" within the hospital, and certification in rape cases (Palley, 1978:226). In its ruling, the Supreme Court disallowed all of the state prerogatives.

The two 1973 decisions acted to limit the state's ability to restrict and/or deny abortion to any woman. As might be expected, a spate of pregnancy termination activity occurred in the aftermath of these decisions. The issue, however, was not limited to the medical arena nor did it go unapproved. Social and political pressure, particularly by anti-abortion or pro-life individuals and groups, quickly surfaced and received national attention.

In fact, only four years later, the Court, in its rulings on three cases (Maher v. Roe; Beal v. Doe; Poelker v. Doe), retreated from the earlier decisions by upholding state Medicaid laws and public hospital practices which forbade "nontherapeutic" (those in which the mother's life is not at issue) abortion. In effect the Supreme Court had concluded that the funding of medically unnecessary, that is, elective, abortions was to be left to the states.

The abortion issue was a signal to a wider sense of the society's meanderings. The growing liberalism we have just sketched was being reacted to and pressured. During the latter half of the 1970's the mind set of the nation once again moved politically to the right and culminated in a landslide victory for a national Republican ticket predicated on a self-avowedly conservative platform (Galbraith, 1981; Reichley, 1981-82). The

Supreme Court ruled on cases that terminated mandatory busing to achieve integration, the Equal Rights Amendment was defeated by insufficient ratification of state legislatures, the President openly favored federal funding for educational institutions that practiced blatant racial discrimination, and the legislative branch - with the full support of the President - began deliberations that would deny any public funding for abortion. As evidenced by the actions of the ruling polity (perhaps a sensitive index to the nation's overall social conscience) the country entering the 80's was moving toward a more traditional, conservative posture (Conover and Feldman, 1981).

Social Turmoil's Effect on "Rural" Culture

Where in all of this social turmoil and cultural wandering was rural America? How was the cultural component faring? Was it meaningfully identifiable, worth noting?

Such are the kinds of basic knowledge questions this research was intended to address. To do so, information from the National Opinion Research Center's (NORC) General Social Surveys (1972-80) was examined. Attention was particularly focused on these representative, national survey's (Sample N=986 in 1972; 1,128 in 1980) distribution of answers to a variety of questions centered on racial equality, abortion, and civil liberties. It is this area where we looked to index a possible cultural component of rurality and note the changing (or not) contours to such a phenomenon over time and across social strata of the American population.

To accomplish the task we extracted 16 questions from the NORC General Social Survey that were asked both in 1972 and 1980. Investigating possible changes in a phenomenon requires the same data types from two time periods. This simple requirement alone narrowed considerably the range of available information pertinent to our ends. Not all questions asked in the 1980

survey were also asked in 1972 and vice versa. Within this methodological restriction, an informative pool still remained.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The 16 items selected for study, see Table 1, clearly do not cover the entirety of what one might consider to be the domain of a "rural culture." By most understandings of the idea, "culture" is broad; we have tried, however, to be focused. The focus is around social issues that, given the recent history of the society (as just sketched), should be a reasonably sensitive probe to a wider and deeper current - the notion of rural culture being relatively reluctant to shed established mores, be, in other words, socially conservative. A single study cannot do everything one might ideally wish it could. Civil liberties, abortion, and race relations are important, touchy, and very much present issues of divisiveness on the larger American scene in the last 20 years. Charting them should give a worthwhile reading on the degree to which social conservatism exists in the countryside.

The 16 questions for each time period were submitted to a principal factor analysis (Rummel, 1967). As can be seen from the results presented in Table 1, oblique pattern loadings showed three distinct attitude domains ordering the 16 questions in both 1972 and 1980. The first factor composes six items, all of which deal with concerns about <u>civil liberties</u>. The second factor is defined in both years by six items dealing with the acceptability of <u>abortion</u>. Finally, four items that tap attitudes toward <u>race relations</u> make up the third factor. The strong similarity of pattern between the two years suggests that, despite the tumult of events about the matters identified as factors of a social conservatism dimension, the attitude domains attached to them showed relative continuity across time. Indeed, that consistency may well be part of the tumult. Be that as it may, the

particular point of our concern is less the pattern of attitude items themselves than an identification of a set of characteristics that explain the variation in the three dimensions of social conservatism and to determine whether the explanatory structure is stable over time.

Determinants of Social Conservatism

The sociological literature is consistent in identifying several sociodemographic characteristics deemed important in understanding social conservatism specifically, and rurality more generally. As noted above, rurality is characteristically taken as a compound idea with ecological, occupational, and cultural aspects jointly considered. With the cultural element cast as the (statistically) dependent variable, logic requires that some measures for the other two facets be invoked. In the current analyses, an ecological dimension was operationalized by three measures of residence: size of the respondent's community of current residence; size of the person's residence at age 16; and the SRC Belt Code. That code (developed by Laserwitz (1960)) describes metropolitan dominance through the use of a six-digit classification procedure for ranking size of place of residence. Occupation as a dimension was indexed by a dummy variable setup to denote whether the person was employed as a professional-manager, an operative-service worker, a farmer, or working in an extractive industry. Other variables that have been shown to be important predictors of social conservatism are age, religion, education, and socioeconomic status (Beaier, et al., 1965; Willits and Bealer, 1967; Willits, et al, 1973, 1974). We have included a measure for all of these plus two additional - sex and race. The substantive attitudes at issue make these obvious candidates for inclusion.

With the set of explanatory variables defined the analytic task then becomes one of determining which variables are most important in statistically accounting for variation in social conservatism scores, and

subsequently, testing for stability of the explanatory structure over time. There are a number of ways to perform such a test (Johnstone, 1972); we employed a procedure devised by Chow (1960), to test the equality between sets of coefficients in two linear regressions. By performing three different regressions and comparing pairs of residual sums of squares it is possible to address three separate but related issues: 1) are the explanatory models for 1972 and 1980 completely homogeneous in terms of their structure?; 2) are the slopes of the regression equations equivalent for both years?; 3) are the intercepts of the regressions different in 1972 and 1980 (slopes assumed constant)?

The relevant error sum of squares and associated degrees of freedom for all three dimensions of social conservatism are presented in Table 2. The Chow test results for homogeneity of slopes, intercepts, and the complete models are also contained in Table 2.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

As evidenced by the various F values in Table 2, the complete models for the two time periods were different (i.e. nonhomogeneous). Further, the F values indicate that both the slopes and the intercepts of the regressions for the two years noted were nonhomogeneous. The implication is simply that the explanatory structure differed between 1972 and 1980 and two separate regression models for those time periods must be estimated. The results of the separate regression estimations are presented in Table 3.

The Chow tests indicated that the regression intercepts differed between 1972 and 1980. An examination of these intercepts show that in every one of the three attitude dimensions the value in 1980 was significantly lower than that manifest in the 1972 data. This indicates that, ceteris paribus, the

level of social conservatism increased over the period in question - higher values indicate higher levels of liberalism.[3]

Given that the explanatory structure showed nonhomogeneity at the two time periods, it was necessary to estimate separate models. The following section examines the difference in the explanatory structures for the three dimensions of social conservatism.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

There are two separate issues that can be addressed by an examination of the data in Table 3. The first is a determination of what structural differences there are across time within each of the dimensions of social conservatism. A second is an examination of the extent to which the impact of any given explanatory variables is consistant across the three dimensions within as well as across time periods. We address both issues below.

Data relating to civil liberty attitudes are contained in the first four columns of Table 3. The data indicate that level of education was the single most important explanatory variable in the model for both 1972 and 1980. In both cases, lower levels of education were associated with increased levels of social conservatism. Increased age, being married, having lower incomes, and relatively high levels of church attendance were all important predictors of attitude difference in both time periods. The impacts of marital status and church attendance were, however, more pronounced in 1980 than in 1972. Religious affiliation was also a consistent predictor across time with Protestants expressng more conservative views than any other denomination.

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[3]This finding is consistent with the capsule of events we sketched in the early part of the paper. It is at odds, however, with recent results reported by Chafetz and Ebaugh (1983). They reported no measureable increase in conservatism. The difference in results is due to the measure of change employed. They used change in gross mean factor scores, whereas we examined change in levels of factor scores after having controlled out the effects of all sociodemographic characteristics.

If attention is turned to occupation a different picture emerges. In 1972 professionals and managers were significantly more tolerant than other occupational groups in the area of civil liberties. By 1980 professionals still represent the most tolerant group, but there were no longer statistically significant differences. Of the three ecological measures, size of residence at age 16 is a significant predictor at both time points with those individuals experiencing early residence in small communities expressing the more conservative views. Size of present community is not a significant predictor at either time.

If attention is turned to attitudes toward racial segregation it is apparent that the model structure is similar in many ways to the civil liberties model. Eduation, age, income and frequency of church attendance effect racial attitudes in the expected manner. Higher levels of education and income and lower levels of church attendance and younger age groups are most tolerant. The remainder of the model structure diverges substantially from that of civil liberties. In the area of occupation, farmers express the most conservative opinions both in 1972 and 1980. However, while professionals/managers are relatively less conservative, persons employed in extractive industry are more liberal in 1972 than are the professionals. By 1980 the situation has reversed.

The impact of religious denomination also differs considerably from the civil liberties model. Being a member of any religious group (versus no expressed affiliation) results in decreased tolerance levels in the area of racial segregation. Jews (-.51) and Protestants (-.50) are least tolerant followed by Catholics (-.35).

The rurality variables showed a certain consistency between the two attitude domains. Size of the community where one resided at age 16 continued to show the same relationship; small-town reared persons expressed

more conservative attitudes. The relationship was statistically significant in 1972, though not so in 1980. Size of one's current place of residence again failed to demonstrate any impact. However, occupation showed a change. Whereas this factor was largely dormant regarding protection of civil liberties attitudes, it was more important for race issues. Being a farmer increased the likelihood that the person would be more conservative. The relationship was statistically significant in both 1972 and 1980. The same could be said of a person's being in a professional or managerial role; they were likely to be less conservative. The other job classification types showed no important predictive capability except for an extractive industry classification in 1972. Here a relatively high level of intolerance was found. The relationship diminished to inconsequentiality by 1980.

The structure of the abortion attitude model was less stable over time and differed substantially from the other two areas. As was the case with both civil liberties and race relations, the less educated expressed more conservative attitudes. However, the level of education had less impact on attitudes towards abortion than frequency of church attendance. As in the first two instances, more conservative attitudes were expressed by individuals with lower incomes.

Beyond these similarities, the abortion model was unique. There was no significant occupational variation in 1972. Professionals/managers were relatively liberal in 1980 (b=.19), but contrary to the first two attitude domains, farmers were significantly more liberal than any other occupational grouping (b=.70). Further, persons employed in extractive industries were least liberal in 1980 (b=-.38), an impact that was reverse of that found in the racial attitudes model. Three additional explanatory variables were significant in 1980 but not in 1972. Specifically, in 1980, being unmarried, female, and white was associated with more liberal attitudes toward abortion.

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The only significant differential regarding religious affiliation was whether the individual was Catholic. Catholics, on average, were not tolerant of abortion.

The rurality variables proved a mixed bag. The situation with occupation has already been noted, with the unexpected finding being the relatively liberal stance of farmers on abortion. As in the other two models, size of current community had no discernible impact on expressed opinions. Place of residence at age 16 continued to be a significant predictor for both periods, though in 1972 originating from a larger place was associated with less tolerant attitudes (b=-.04); in 1980, however, the larger the community of origin the more liberal was the expressed attitude.

Conclusions: So What About "Rurality?"

The impedus for this study was the long standing concern of the discipline with the notion of rurality. More narrowly, our concern has been with an identification of attitude structures that are indicate of a "rural culture" and the further issue of whether or not the cultural component of rurality is found in conjunction with ecological and occupational structures that are thoretically important.

Beyond the above mentioned issues we have examined the hypothesis that the structure of the aforementioned relationships have remained constant over time. Using comparable self-report data from the 1972 and 1980 General Social Survey we found that the attitude structures relating to abortion, racial segregation and civil liberties have changed very little over time (i.e., the contribution of items in each of the factors remained relatively constant).

Using the Chow test for the difference in intercepts it was found that all three social conservatism domains exhibited statistically significant changes over the decade. Specifically, there were significant increases in the levels of expressed conservatism. The changes for the racial attitude factor and the civil liberties factor were more pronounced than the change in abortion attitudes. The final change was to determine the extent of structural stability in the determinants of social conservatism. A Chow test for total model homogenity and for different slopes indicated that the overall explanatory structure did change over the time period investigated. Some effects did, however, remain stable. Higher levels of education were affiliated with higher levels of liberalism across all three attitude domains at both time periods. Conversely, increased levels of church attendance were consistently found in conjunction with increased levels of social conservatism.

The critical question remaining revolves around the presumptive rurality dimensions of the model. One was particularly notable. Size of place of current residence was the <u>only variable</u> included in the study that failed to reach statistical significance in explaining socially conservative attitudes in any of the three domains in either time period. Because this is most often the proxy used in contemporary research for other aspects of a rurality idea, especially the cultural, we encourage caution in interpreting such literature.

On the other side of consistency, size of residence at age 16 was a significant predictor in five of the six models (not the 1980 racial attitude model). With the exception of the abortion model in 1972, the smaller the place of origin the more conservative the expressed attitude. This is the patterning that is supposed to exist, given any validity to a traditional sense of a rurality construct. Since most of the people in

this adult sample who were small-town reared would have been growing up in such places largely prior to the recently witnessed migration turnaround, the possible early socialization to more socially conservative norms could be carried over to the present and help account for some part of the showing made.[4] Current residence, if the population turnabout brings with it an admixing of values, might be expected to show a less differentiating pattern of prediction - which is what was the case in the data.

Occupation had a checkered pattern both in terms of consistency of being a statistically significant predictor, and in terms of direction of the relationship. Thus, being a farmer was unrelated to civil liberties orientations in both 1972 and 1980; this fact significantly predicted a conservatism tendency on matters of race in both time periods; it was a significant correlate of abortion attitudes in 1980 but not in 1972. However, the stand of the average farmer on abortion was a relatively supportive one vis-a-vis the other occupational groupings distinguished. At the same time, persons employed in extractive industries were the most strongly opposed to abortion. Since an occupational dimension to rurality often yokes these two categories of jobs as one, it is clear that any such bracketing on the issue of abortion would result in creating a class of persons with great heterogeneity. The essence of a good analytical category or class in science is homogeneity.

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[4]The model fit - or predictive capability - for the civil liberties dimension was superior to that for racial attitudes and abortion; even so, the former explained only 35 percent of the variance, while the other two models ranged from 17 to 22 percent of total variance accounted for. The R^2 values for our regressions are quite typical of sociological research past and present. The large amount of unaccounted variance in social conservatism score prediction means there is probably measurement error and underspecification in the models. Both of these conditions must temper any conclusions from the data; they must be tentative.

Whether rurality can be made to pass muster on that criterion is, given our data, not consistently clear. This is not to suggest that rurality is a vacuous idea. Rather, if it is to be useful, "rurality" needs careful construction and careful interpretation.

Table 1: Principal factor solution (oblique factor pattern loadings) of social conservatism items, 1972 and 1980.

Question	Civil liberties 1972	Civil liberties 1980	Abortion 1972	Abortion 1980	Racial relations 1972	Racial relations 1980
Should a person be allowed to speak in public if:						
She/he is against churches and religion?	.72	.82	.05	-.10	-.06	-.11
She/he was a communist?	.71	.69	-.05	-.06	-.10	-.03
Should a person be allowed to teach in a university if:						
She/he is against churches and religion?	.78	.83	-.04	-.02	-.05	-.10
She/he was a communist?	.80	.88	-.09	-.13	-.04	-.10
Should books be removed from public libraries if they:						
Express antireligious sentiments?	.66	.72	-.06	-.09	-.08	-.09
Were written by admitted communists?	.83	.93	-.08	-.07	-.09	-.14
Should there be laws prohibiting interracial marriage?	.19	.13	-.02	-.04	.50	.53
Would you object to having a black to dinner?	-.22	.15	-.12	-.09	.89	.73
Should whites keep blacks out of their neighborhoods?	.00	-.02	-.07	-.11	.66	.68
Would you send your child to a school with several blacks:	.12	-.18	-.06	-.02	.74	.72
Should legal abortion be possible:						
If the child might have serious defects?	-.21	-.06	.76	.74	-.02	.19
For a married woman who wants no more children?	.09	-.13	.73	.82	.10	.05
When a pregnancy is dangerous to a woman's health?	-.18	-.06	.66	.63	-.01	-.14
For a family who can't afford more children?	.02	-.16	.84	.86	-.15	.03
When the pregnancy is the result of rape?	-.15	-.08	.77	.74	-.06	-.14
If the woman is unmarried and doesn't want to marry?	.10	-.11	.77	.84	-.18	.00
Reliability, θ =	.74	.80	.80	.80	.53	.43

Interfactor Correlations:	1972	1980
Abortion - Civil Liberties	.51	.56
Abortion - Racial Relations	.45	.42
Civil Liberties - Racial Relations	.71	.71

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Table 2. Results of Chow tests for model homogeneity.

Models	Attitude Domain: Civil Liberties	Race Relations	Abortion
Completely restricted (S'S)	3160.525[a]	2578.315	3328.107
$F = \frac{(S_1+S_3)/K(P-1)}{S_4/N-2(K)}$	3.06[c]	2.73	2.89
Partly restricted (e'e)	3140.064	2561.965	3325.295
$F = \frac{S_1/(P-1)}{S_2/(N-P-K+1)}$	13.86	13.56	1.79
Completely unrestricted (r'r)	3080.124	2519.540	3247.925
$F = \frac{S_3/(PK-P-K+1)}{S_4/N-2(K)}$	2.41	2.09	2.95
Degrees of freedom[d]			
1 S_1	20.461[b]	16.350	2.812
2152 S_2	3140.064	2561.965	3325.295
17 S_3	59.940	42.425	77.370
2108 S_4	3080.124	2519.540	3247.925

a = error sums of square

b = sums of square for Chow test

c = F value

d = S_1=S'S-e'e
S_2=e'e
S_3=e'e-r'r
S_4=r'r

Table 3: Regression of Social Conservatism Dimensions on Explanatory Variables

Explanatory variable	Civil liberties				Racial relations				Abortion			
	1972		1980		1972		1980		1972		1980	
	b	β	b	β	b	β	b	β	b	β	b	β
Church attendance	-.07+	-.13	-.11+	-.18	-.02	-.04	-.01	-.03	-.15+	-.27	-.18+	-.33
Professional-mgrs.	.13*	.04	.11	.03	.17+	.06	.14+	.06	.01	.00	.19+	.06
Operatives-service	-.13*	-.04	-.05	-.01	-.12	-.04	.04	.02	-.11	-.03	.05	.02
Farming	-.05	-.01	-.02	-.00	-.65+	-.10	-.50+	-.06	.04	.01	.70+	.07
Extractive ind.	-.25	-.04	-.18	-.03	.42**	.08	.06	.01	-.34	-.06	-.38+	-.06
Marital status (m=1)	-.13**	-.04	-.21	-.07	-.16+	-.05	-.05	-.02	-.06	-.02	-.15+	-.05
Age	-.02+	-.23	-.02+	-.18	-.01+	-.13	-.01+	-.15	.00	.01	.00**	.04
Education	.13+	.31	.15	.30	.07+	.18	.09+	.24	.09	.23	.05+	.11
Sex (female=1)	-.10*	-.04	-.00	-.00	.02	.01	.04	.02	.05	.02	.20+	.07
Race (white=1)	-.36	-.01	.16	.03	-.58	-.02	-.84	-.21	.44	.01	.37+	.08
Residence at age 16	.04	.05	.09+	.08	.04**	.05	.02	.02	-.04**	-.05	.07+	.07
Income	.02**	.04	.02	.06	.03	.06	.02	.07	.04+	.08	.04+	.12
Size of community	.00	.02	-.00	-.01	.00	.01	-.00	-.00	-.00	-.01	.00	.04
SRC Belt code	-.07+	-.08	-.01	-.02	-.06+	-.08	-.02	-.03	-.08+	-.10	-.02	-.02
Protestant	-.33+	-.12	-.38+	-.12	-.50+	-.19	-.17	-.07	-.14	-.05	-.07	-.02
Catholic	-.15	-.05	-.15	-.04	-.35+	-.12	-.03	-.01	-.44	-.15	-.43+	-.13
Jewish	-.21	-.03	-.18	-.02	-.51+	-.08	-.00	-.00	.25	.03	.32	.03
(Intercept)	2.48		1.59		5.22		4.56		2.21		1.75	
R^2	.33		.32		.17		.20		.22		.22	

* = P ≤ .05
** = P ≤ .01
+ = P ≤ .001

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